Trump, Irrationality and Game Theory

I have been openly critical of Trump as a president going back to before the election. While I want radical change I do not believe the price for this ought to be going backwards on foundational issues such as the rule of law, press freedom and science. Nonetheless it has been fascinating to observe how Trump’s potential or actual irrationality has opened the door for progress on some issues that were previously deemed intractable, such as North Korea.

It is well known that even in relative simple games, such as repeated prisoner’s dilemma the set of sustainable equilibria grows significantly when there is some possibility of at least one of the actors being irrational (some of the time). In this regard, Trump is a stark contrast to his predecessors such as Obama, Clinton and the Bushes who cultivated an image of themselves as rational actors. For an opponent such as Kim Jong Un, Trump’s (potential/actual) irrationality ironically makes cooperation possible when it was not possible before.

Conversely, continuing to pursue a strictly rational strategy in the face of an actor such as Trump can have disastrous results. That certainly played itself out in the Republican primaries and to some extent in the general election as well. The Democratic party leadership is continuing to operate by “rational” rules, which leads them to meddle in primary elections with the goal of fielding “electable” candidates. This may succeed in congressional elections in the near term but is likely a mistake with regard to their longer term national prospects.

If you want a great science fiction read in which potential irrationality and the equilibria it can sustain is a major plot driver, I highly recommend the Three Body Problem Trilogy.